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COMMENT
HAWAIIAN OKE: KIEFER-STEWART REVISITED?
ALAN S. GOLD*
Fundamental to a conspiracy' under section one of the Sherman
Act' is the presence of concerted action between two or more persons or
entities.' In light of this duality requirement, in every section-one con-
spiracy litigation, consideration must be given to whether each alleged
conspirator constitutes a separate person or entity at law.
The utilization of incorporated susidiary4 and unincorporated divi-
sion arrangements within multi-corporate enterprises, generated by the
search for more efficient, less costly production-distribution techniques,5
has added special conceptual difficulties to the interpretation and ap-
plication of the conspiracy provision of section one of the Sherman Act.
In addition to the basic inquiry of whether two or more parties actually
conspired to restrain trade, increased emphasis has been given to the
problem of whether, as a matter of law, subsidiaries6 and divisions7 are
capable of conspiring within the context of their enterprise.
8
* Member of the Florida Bar; J.D., Duke Law School; former law clerk to Judge
Charles A. Carroll, Florida Third District Court of Appeal.
1. A conspiracy has been defined as a combination of two or more persons in con-
certed action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself
unlawful by criminal or unlawful means. United States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698, 702 (N.D.
Cal. 1895).
2. This section provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is . . . illegal." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1964).
3. See, e.g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1952); Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737 (8th Cir. 1909); Stewart v.
Hevelone, 283 F. Supp. 842 (D. Neb. 1968); 1 H. TOULMIN, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 13.10 (1949).
4. A subsidiary may be defined as "a corporation wholly or virtually wholly-owned
by a parent or a corporation with a majority of voting capital stock owned by a parent
and a minority held by non-competitors of the parent only for investment purposes."
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 30n.106
(1955) [hereinafter cited as ATT'Y. GEN. REP.].
5. For a listing of other incentives which generate the use of subsidiaries and divisions
in multicorporate enterprises, see Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 27, 34 (1949) (psychological incentives); Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1947) (tax purposes); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws,
44 ILL. L. REv. 743, 765 (1950) (managerial convenience); Note, 100 U. PENN. L. REv.
1006, 1024 (1952) (division of risk, debt, and earnings to correspond with diverse needs
within the enterprise as well as increase of capitalization). The primary motivation for the
adoption of unincorporated divisions within the Seagram enterprise in the instant case
was to escape antitrust pressures. See Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915, 920, 920n.17 (D. Hawaii 1967).
6. See cases cited notes 23 & 24 infra and accompanying text.
7. See cases cited note 31 infra and accompanying text.
8. For earlier discussions of subsidiaries and their relationship within the multicorporate
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In Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc.,9 the District Court of Hawaii attempted to clarify the legal issue
of whether three unincorporated but autonomous divisions of the same
corporation had the capacity to conspire among themselves. To determine
conspiratorial competency, the court invoked a control test which char-
acterized the divisions as separate, autonomous sales entities. These divi-
sions were, therefore, capable of conspiring at the same market level
since each was "endowed with separable, self-generated and moving
power to act in the pertinent area of economic activity"' 0 alleged to be
anticompetitive. Upon appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding, inter alia, that the Seagram divisions
lacked the requisite independence. Since a corporation and its unincor-
porated divisions, are one entity at law, they are incapable of conspiring
among themselves."
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. manufactures and sells various
brands of liquors to its national distributor and wholly owned subsidiary,
the House of Seagram, Inc. 2 The House of Seagram, while retaining
control over banking, employing, and accounting responsibilities,"8 has
in turn delegated its national marketing function to seven unincorporated
enterprise as legal entities, capable of conspiring in restraint of trade, see ATT'Y GEN. REP.
30; Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MoNT.
L. REV. 158 (1962); Carlston, Basic Antitrust Concepts, 53 MIcu. L. REv. 1033 (1955);
Handler, Through The Anti-Trust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Antitrust Review, 57 CAL.
L. REv. 182 (1969); Kessler & Stem, Competition, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69
YALE L.J. 1 (1959) ; Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely Between a Corporation and Its
Officers Acting On Its Behalf In Unreasonable Restraint 'Of Interstate Commerce Violate
Section 1 Of The Sherman Act?, 11 FED. B. J. 130 (1951); Krause, The Multi-Corporate
International Business Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act-Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy
Revisited, 17 Bus. LAW. 912 (1962); McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises,
and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183 (1955) ; RahI, Conspiracy and the
Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950); Sprunk, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 9 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST SEC. REP. 20 (1956); Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L. J. 5 (1963); Sunderland, Changing Legal Concepts in the
Antitrust Field, 3 SYRACUSE L. REv. 60 (1951); Whipple, Problems of Combination--In-
tergration, Intra-Corporate Conspiracy and Joint Ventures, 1958 CCH ANTITRUST L. SYM.
34; Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 20
(1968); Comment, Intra-Enterprise Consipracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372
(1954); Note, 43 ILL. L. REV. 551 (1948); Note, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1006 (1952).
9. 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967). The district court's opinion has produced com-
ment, both pro and con. See Burrus & Savarese, Developments in Anti-trust During the
Past Year, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 381, 384 (1968); Handler, Through the Anti-trust Looking
Glass-Twenty-First Antitrust Review, 57 CAL. L. REV. 182 (1969); Kempf, Bathtub Con-
spiracies, Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent Brew, 24 Bus. LAW. 173 (1968); Willis &
Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20
(1968); Note, 6 DUQUESNE U. L. REV. 157 (1968); Note, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 607 (1968);
Note, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW 786 (1968); Note, 37 U. Cix. L. REV. 223 (1968); Note, 1968
U. ILL. L. F. 248; Note, 21 VAND. L. REV. 375 (1968).
10. 272 F. Supp. at 920.
11. Hawiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 416 F.2d 71 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
12. 272 F. Supp. at 915 (pretrial statement for plaintiff).
13. Id. at 924.
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sales divisions14 that engage in competition with one another in selling
their designated Seagram-brand liquors through wholesale distributors.' 5
One of these wholesalers charged 6 the Calvert, Four Roses, and Frank-
fort divisions of the House of Seagram, among others,'7 with conspiring
to boycott and thereby eliminate him from the wholesale distribution
business in violation of section one of the Sherman Act.'" At trial, after
ruling in favor of the Wholesaler's proposed jury instruction, the court
instructed the jury that "each . . . division of the House of Seagram
should be treated as separate entities for the purpose of determining
whether there has been a combination or conspiracy."' 9
The law is clear that a nonaffiliated corporation, being an artificial
person at law, is a separate legal entity and capable of conspiring with
other corporations or persons in violation of section one of the Sherman
Act.20 Similarly, when the alleged conspirators are affiliated corporations
and are thereby components of one enterprise, the courts have encoun-
tered little conceptual difficulty in determining the conspiratorial com-
petency of each participant. Where restraint of trade has been proven,
intraenterprise conspiracies between either a parent corporation and its
subsidiaries or the subsidiaries alone have been held violative of section
one.21 In each instance, the courts have employed the intraenterprise-
conspiracy doctrine22 which characterizes each subsidiary as a separate
14. Each Seagram division is called a "company." See 416 F.2d at 73.
15. 272 F. Supp. at 920.
16. The plaintiff, Hawaiian Oke & Liquors Ltd., brought a treble damage action against
the Calvert, Four Roses, and Frankfort divisions of the House of Seagram under section
4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), for injury allegedly resulting from the de-
fendents' violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
17. Other defendants to the action include:
1. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. and the House of Seagram.
2. McKesson & Robbins Inc., a corporation, which, among other things, conducts a
wholesale liquor distributing business in many parts of the United States, including Hawaii.
3. Barton Distilling Company, a corporation, which is a manufacturer of alcoholic
beverages, and Barton Wester Distilling Co., a corporation, which is a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Barton. See 416 F.2d at 71.
No attempt will be made here to outline any other facts as they relate to these other
defendants since this discussion is solely concerned with the question of intracorporate
conspiracy among the division of the House of Seagram.
18. See 272 F. Supp. at 916 (pretrial statement for plaintiff).
19. Id. at 917.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). Since each nonaffiliated corporation is a separate entity at
law, two or more corporations engaging in concerted activity in restraint of trade satisfied
the duality requirement of section 1. See, e.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.,
324 U.S. 293 (1945) ; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) ; Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); Maple Flooring Manuf. Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. Addiston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (E.D. Tenn.
1898). See also United States v. American Naval Stores Co., 172 F. 445, 467 (S.D. Ga.
1909).
21. See notes 23 & 24 infra and cases cited therein.
22. The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine evolved from the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1934), in which
the Court recognized that Sherman Act violations must be determined on the basis of the
activities of the parties, not on the basis of the form which a corporation chooses to adopt.
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and distinct entity capable of conspiring with its parent's or with other
affiliated subsidiaries.24 This doctrine25 is predicated on the rationale
23. The first decision to support the notion that a subsidiary could conspire with its
parent in violation of section 1 was United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376
(7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). The court in the General Motors case
refused to allow the corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries to utilize their affiliation
as a ground for escaping section I sanctions. Instead, the court stated that:
[T]he appellants [General Motors and its subsidiaries] [cannot] enjoy the benefits
of separate corporate identity and escape the consequences of an illegal combination
in restraint of trade by insisting that they are in effect a single trader. The test of
illegality under the Sherman Act is not so much the particular form of business
organization effected, as it is the presence or absence of restraint of trade and com-
merce. But even if the single trader doctrine were applicable, it would not help the
appellants. Id. at 404.
A commentator has argued that these three sentences can be translated as follows: "Form
Matters. Form does not really matter. Even if form did really matter, you're stuck any-
how." McQuade, Conspiracy, MultiCorporate Enterprises and Section I of the Sherman
Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183, 191 (1955). For the view that the General Motors rationale seems
to ignore the fact that section 1 of the Sherman Act does not make all restraints of trade
illegal, but only conspiracies in restraints of trade, see Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J. 5 (1963).
See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969)
(Conspiracy between a parent and its subsidiary) ; Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Co., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (Conspiracy among subsidiaries themselves and their par-
ent); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (conspiracy among
a domestic parent and its foreign subsidiaries); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) (conspiracy among a parent and its subsidiaries); United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (conspiracy between vertically affiliated
corporations); cf. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram, Inc., 272 F. Supp.
915, 919 (D. Hawaii 1967) (dictum that a corporation can conspire with its subsidiaries);
Streiffer v. Seafarers Sea Chest Corp., 162 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1958) (combination
between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary); Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms
Co., 104 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Cal. 1952), aff'd 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 991 (1956) (dictum that corporation dealing with its subsidiaries may be guilty
of violation of antitrust laws).
24. A conspiracy between incorporated subsidiaries of the same corporation has been
held violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). In that case, a wholesale drug concern charged that
the defendent corporations "had agreed or conspired to sell liquor only to those Indiana
wholesalers who would resell at prices fixed" by the defendants. Id. at 212. The Court
dismissed the objection that the instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandising
unit cannot conspire since such a suggestion ran counter to the Court's past decisions that
common ownership and control did not liberate corporations from the impact of the anti-
trust laws. Id. at 215.
25. Some commentators have expressed concern that an excessive application of the
Intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in characterizing subsidiaries as separate legal entities,
capable of conspiring within the context of the enterprise, could harass the subsidiary
method of conducting business out of existence.
If the accident of separate corporate entities in a unified enterprise, which probably
arose for tax or managerial convenience purposes, is to be seized upon as an anti-
trust violation, the courts will be put to the necessity of following a logical path
to absurdity. The corporate family might first try evasion by abandoning separate
entities. This development in turn would invite the finding of conspiracy between
the single corporation and one of its officers and directors . . . [olr the corporate
veil could be fully pierced and conspiracies of all variety found among the individ-
uals managing the corporation. . . . [O]nce the enterprise unity is ignored in favor
of form, there is no particular stopping-point short of the single entrepreneur with
no employees . . . . Every company would be a nest of conspiracies.
Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743, 764-66 (1950).
A similar view is expressed by another commentator who contends that there is no
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that there is no substantive distinction between those corporations that
are affiliated under common ownership and those that are nonaffiliated.
Incorporation in either case vests affiliated and nonaffiliated corpora-
tions with a separate identity as artificial beings at law. In applying the
intraenterprise-conspiracy doctrine, the courts have not considered the
control actually exercised by the parent over its subsidiary's operations
to be relevant but, rather, they have emphasized that affiliated corpora-
tions in a single enterprise should be precluded from engaging in anti-
competitive practices and then escaping Sherman Act liability by
resorting to a defense based on their form of organization.26
Intraenterprise conspiracy is not limited only to concerted activity
between affiliated corporations. A conspiracy can arise within the frame-
work of a single corporation that is in turn a component of an enterprise
structure. With intracorporate conspiracy, which is a facet of intraen-
terprise conspiracy, the courts have been confronted with the concep-
tual problem of whether corporate officers or unincorporated divisions
constitute legal persons or entities capable of engaging in concerted ac-
tivities with other officers of divisions of the same corporation.27 The
place for the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine within section 1 of the Sherman Act since
it gives a prosecutor carte blanche to attack multicorporate enterprises. He argues that the
next logical step would be to admit that coordinate action within a corporation that func-
tions through divisions is violative of section 1. He anticipates that "the effect is to read
the requirement of conspiracy out of the Act, and to make the presence or absence of re-
straint the only criterion of violation." McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises,
and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. Rxv. 183, 216 (1955). See also, Kemph, Bath-
tub conspiracies, Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent Brew, 24 Bus. LAW. 173 (1968);
Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J.
5, 27 (1963); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries,
43 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 20 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 394 U.S. 134,
141-42 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215
(1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947); Krause, The Multi-
Corporate International Business Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act-Intra-Enterprise
Conspiracy Revisited, 17 Bus. LAW. 912, 932 (1962).
The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine as applied to corporations and their subsidiaries
remains a viable concept, theoretically capable of encompassing other section 1 conspiracies
not reviewed in prior court decisions. The United States Supreme Court has never in-
dicated what, if any, are the limits of this doctrine. See Hawaiian Oke Liquors, Ltd v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969). Thus, under this theory,
concerted activity in restraint of trade between a parent corporation and a division of a
subsidiary of that parent, or between two independent divisions of two independent sub-
sidiaries where the divisions conspire between themselves and with the parent may effec-
tively be regulated. In each instance, the single entity rule is applicable to treat each
subsidiary and its division as one entity at law. Traditionally, a division, as an agent,
assumed the legal entity status of its corporation. See note 37 infra, and accompanying text.
Consequently, vertical or horizontal concerted activity between a subsidiary and its parent
or between the subsidiaries themselves and their parent would be actionable under section
1.
27. Whether the corporation and its officers should be regarded as one entity at law
and thus incapable of conspiring in violation of section one remains controversial. At one
extreme, some commentators argue that a narrow reading of section 1 so as to exempt
intracorporate conspiracy between corporate agents is undesirable insofar as it insulates from
antitrust sanctions activity that inhibits competition. Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract
1970]
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problem was first considered with regard to a section-one conspiracy
charge between a corporation and one of its officers.28 Instead of utilizing
an intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine that would have characterized the
alleged participants as distinct entities, the court chose to employ the
single-entity rule that a corporation and its officer were but one person
at law, and, therefore, incapable of satisfying the duality requirement
of section one.29 The application of the single-entity rule thereby avoided
the fiction that conscious participation could occur between the minds
of both the corporation and its officer when that officer, acting within the
scope of his duties, was in effect the alter ego of the corporation.80
Even when two or more officers acting on behalf of their corporation
are charged with concerted activity in restraint of trade, the prevailing
view regards the corporation and its officers as one entity.81 For example,
and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959). A middle of the road position is suggested
by another commentator who would limit possible violations to section one conspiracy
charges against the officers alone when acting in behalf of their corporation. Barndt, Two
Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MoNT. L. REv. 158, 184
(1962). In regard to this violation, the only conceptual problem is reaching beyond the
individual officers and holding the corporation liable for the conspiracy. But if the corpora-
tion can be held liable for the conspiracy of its officers to defraud the government, it should
also be liable for the conspiracy of its officers to impose an unreasonable restraint of trade
in its behalf. Id. at 186. At the opposite extreme, the Arr'k GEN. REP. regards favorably
those decisions finding no conspiracy in restraint of trade in joint action solely between a
corporation and its officers:
Since a corporation can only act through its officers, and since the normal com-
mercial conduct of a single trader acting alone may restrain trade, many activities
of any business could be interdicted were joint action solely by the agents of a
single corporation acting on its behalf itself held to constitute a conspiracy in
restraint of trade. Id. at 30-31.
28. Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737 (8th Cir. 1909). In this case,
the corporation and its agent were charged with combining in violation of section one to
deprive a coal dealer of his supply of coal. In addition to not finding a conspiracy, the court
held that there was no substantial evidence of any combination between the defendants
either to refuse to sell coal to the dealer or to refuse to transport it to him. Id. at 744.
29. Id. at 745.
30. "[E]very time an agent commits an offense within the scope of his authority
under this theory the corporation necessarily combines with him to commit it." Id. at 745.
This same reasoning is also applicable to concert of action between two or more officers.
See generally comment, Developments in the Law of Criminal Conspiracy, 72 IHARv. L. REV.
920, 952-53 (1959).
31. Officers, directors, agents, and employees of a corporation, acting within the scope
of their authority or performing their corporate duties, have not been considered separate
legal entities, capable of conspiring with their corporation in violation of section one of the
Sherman Act. See, e.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 643 n.9 (9th
Cir. 1969); South End Oil Co. Inc., v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Inl. 1965);
Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 266 (D. Colo. 1964) ;
Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop, 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Cal. 1961); George Wagner &
Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 1958 Trade Cas. ff 69, 214 (E. D. Mich. 1958); Central
Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 153 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1957), rev'd on
other grounds, 257 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Harren Candy Co. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 153
F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Ga. 1957); Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. v. H. Harris & Co., 152 F.
Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1957); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Nassau Research and Dev. Associates,
Inc., 152 F. Supp. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Cott Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale,
Inc., 146 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), appeal dismissed, 243 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1957);
Hershel Cal. Fruit Prod. Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. II 67,928 (N.D. Cal.
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in Nelson Radio & Supply Company v. Motorola, Inc., 82 conspiracy al-
legations against the corporation which were based upon the concerted
anticompetitive practices of corporate officers functioning within the
scope of their duties were dismissed. The officers were not regarded as
legal persons distinct from the corporation but were recognized as the
only medium through which the corporation could act and, consequently,
were susceptible to the same single-entity status as the corporation it-
self.8" Since the corporation alone could not engage in concerted action,
there was no conspiracy in violation of section one.3 4
The single-entity rule was subsequently expanded to encompass
vertical intracorporate concerted activity solely between a corporation
and its unincorporated division.8 5 Citing Nelson" as authority for their
position, the few courts considering the relationship have concluded that
a division, like a corporate officer, was a mere agent of the corporation.8 7
Since the acts of the agent-division were in turn the acts of the corpora-
tion, there could be no conspiracy because it was impossible for a per-
son, real or artificial, to conspire with itself.
1954); Marion County Co-op. Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp 58 (W.D. Ark. 1953),
aff'd, 214 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1954). Contra, Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599, 618
(6th Cir. 1915).
Conspiracies among corporate officers acting on behalf of their corporation have been
found when the object of the concerted activity was a substantive crime. See Egan v. United
States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943) cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943) (conspiracy among
officers to violate Public Utility Holding Company Act); Minnisohn v. United States, 101
F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939) (conspiracy among corporate officers to defraud the United States).
32. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). But see id. at 916
(Rives, J., dissenting). An action was brought against the corporation to recover treble
damages for violation of section one of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff's amended complaint
alleged that the corporation and certain of its officers engaged in concerted activity to
terminate plaintiff's distribution with defendant because of plaintiff's refusal to agree to
cease selling communication equipment obtained from sources other than Motorola. Id. at
913.
33. Id. at 914.
34. Id.
35. See cases cited note 37 infra and accompanying text.
36. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
37. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962) (the Supreme Court specifically reserved the
question of whether a corporation and a division thereof are legally capable of conspiring) ;
Kemwel Auto Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 1 71, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Deter-
jet Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348 (D. Del. 1962); Johnny Maddox Motor
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex. 1960). At the court of appeals level,
the dissenting judge in Poller argued that a corporation can conspire with its division "as
separate and distinct an organization as a wholly owned subsidiary." Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 284 F.2d 599, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Wasington, J., dissenting).
But cf. Justice Jackson's dissent in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593, 606-07 (1951), where it was admitted that if the parent corporation had, within its
own corporate organization, set up separate divisions instead of subsidiaries, there would
have been no vertical intraenterprise conspiracy.
For the view that a corporation can evade the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine if it
does business through unincorporated branches, divisions, or departments, see Ar'v GEN.
REP. 35. See also McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section I of the
Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. Rav. 183 (1955); Turner, An Interview, 34 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
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Prior to Hawaiian Oke, no court had considered the question of
whether two or more divisions on the same market level could constitute
separate legal entities capable of conspiring to restrain trade. The district
court, disregarding the traditional notion that a division did not have an
entity status separate from that of its corporation, 38 innovatively em-
ployed the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine to characterize autonomous
divisions as independent legal entities. In so doing, the court expanded
the scope of actionable conspiracy under section one of the Sherman
Act.8 9
In its opinion, the district court noted that the House of Seagram
divisions were formerly affiliated subsidiaries, and, as such, Kiefer-
Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,4" had been adjudicated guilty
of horizontal conspiracy in violation of section one of the Sherman Act.
It found that the Seagram enterprise, in order to avoid the impact of
Kiefer-Stewart, underwent a corporate reorganization, switching from
subsidiaries to divisions, without a commensurate change in marketing
techniques.4 The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the divisions
were, in substance, the same entities that they were before Kiefer-
Stewart, but without a "paper partition."42
In order to endow autonomous divisions with conspiratorial com-
petency, the district court initially endeavored to distinguish those prior
decisions which precluded section one violations when either corporate
officers engaged in concerted action on behalf of their corporation, or
when a corporation and its unincorporated division were the alleged
participants. The court apparently assumed that the difference in form
between horizontal and vertical conspiracies,43 and between horizontal
113, 123 (1967); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Subsidiaries, 43
N.Y.U.L. REv. 20 (1968); Note, 54 CoLum. L. Rav. 1108 (1954).
38. 272 F. Supp. at 919.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
40. 340 U.S. 213 (1951). See note 24 supra.
41. See 290 F. Supp. at 920-21.
42. Id. at 919. The Hawaiian Oke court recognized that a multicorporate enterprise
could convert its subsidiary organizations to division arrangements and thereby escape sec-
tion-one sanctions since a division has hereunto never had conspiratorial competency. This
was reflected in the following colloquy between counsel for Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.
and the House of Seagram, Inc. which occurred at the close of plaintiff's case during
argument on defendant's motion for a directed verdict:
The Court: It would appear to the Court as an inference only ... that ex-
cellent counsel advised Seagram to tear out the veil of corporate
ownership; nevertheless, keep your divisions . .. as independent
as they were before, but tear out the veil, and then we will have
cured the defect found in our organization setup as pointed out
by the U.S. Supreme Court in [Kiefer-] Stewart.
Mr. Anthony: That is correct.
Id. at 921 n.17. See also note 37 supra.
43. The Hawaiian Oke court did not postulate separate-entity status for a division
when the conspiracy charged was vertical rather than horizontal, but instead acknowledged
that a corporation and its unincorporated division were but one entity at law. 272 F. Supp.
at 919. The court distinguished vertical from horizontal intracorporate conspiracy by stating
that "we are not here dealing with a vertical organization. Rather, the conspiracy alleged
among the Seagram divisions . . .relates to the activity of business entities on the same
level of the corporate structure." Id.
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conspiracies and those among corporate officers,44 rendered the single-
entity rule inapplicable to concerted activity among autonomous divi-
sions on the same economic plane. When the division failed to function
autonomously in the particular economic activity alleged to be anti-
competitive, however, the court left open the question whether the single-
entity rule retained efficacy to treat the divisions and their corporation
as one legal person.
To determine when a division constituted an autonomous legal
entity, the court devised a control test which ascertained whether the
corporation controlled and directed "each facet of the unincorporated
division's operation ...for all purposes," or whether the division was
"endowed with separable, self-generated and moving power to act in the
pertinent area of economic activity" alleged to be anticompetitive.45
Thus, "[i] f the division operates independently in directing the relevant
business activity," it was a separate legal entity.46
Applying the control test, the court concluded that the Frankfort,
Four Roses, and Calvert divisions of the House of Seagrams were fac-
tually and legally capable of conspiring, since each was a self-contained,
independent sales entity, responsible for establishing prices and distribu-
tion systems within a given geographic area.4 7 The court expressed con-
cern over the fact that to reason otherwise would allow a multicorporate
enterprise to avoid section-one sanctions by resorting to a division ar-
rangement that operated identically in terms of substantive economic
function and competitive effect as a subsidiary organization." In looking
beyond "the mere label attached to a particular business entity"49 as
44. In Hawaiian Oke the court considered Nelson as limited to conspiracy between the
corporation and its officers, since officers, unlike divisions, were always identifiable with the
corporation and thereby a single entity with it. Thus, the court concluded that the single
entity rule did not preclude conspiracy between autonomous divisions. Id. at 919.
45. Id. at 920.
46. Id.
47. The factual basis for the conclusion that each Seagram division was an autonomous
legal entity came from pretrial depositions and testimony given during trial. Indicative of the
relationship of the division was the following pretrial statement:
Q. What do you understand to be the nature, if any, sir, of the relation between
the marketing divisions ...?
A. Well, it is pretty well designed along the General Motors setup, where they
are independent sales divisions, in the sense that they compete, the same as
Pontiac competes against . . . Oldsmobile. They are self-contained units. They
have their own products.
Id. at 922 (Testimony of Jack Yogman, Executive Vice-President of Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc.).
The relationship between the divisions was also depicted during the trial.
Q. Now, is it correct that each of these divisions, through its own management,
makes the decision as to who will be the distributors in any area?
A. That's correct. ...
Q. And as head of the division, and your counterpart heads, do they make the
determination as to the price or prices throughout the country, which you are
going to charge to wholesalers for the products?
A. Correct.
Id. at 923 (testimony of Arthur Murphy, President of Calvert).
48. Id. at 919.
49. Id. at 921.
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determinative of a division's conspiratorial competence, the court was
adhering to Supreme-court precedent which emphasized that "differences
in form do not often represent 'differences in substance.' "I'
In an elaborate opinion, only part of which dealt with the question
of intracorporate conspiracy, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine "as applied here," and
returned to the single-entity rule, holding that the district court erred
in instructing the jury that the House of Seagram divisions should be
treated as separate legal entities capable of conspiring with each other.51
This holding is predicated upon one principal ground. Simply stated, the
appellate court, echoing certain commentators who prophesied that the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would wreck havoc on the American
52 ~ Atacorporate enterprise system, reasoned that if the doctrine is accepted,
there would be no practical way to avoid holding that all intracorporate
agreements are, or may be found to be, conspiracies in restraint of
trade.5" The appellate court apparently determined that the intracor-
porate-conspiracy doctrine unreasonably penalized large corporations
which delegate authority and divide labor to insure more effective deci-
sion-making and production-distribution techniques. According to the
appellate court, this is so because the finding of autonomy, and thereby
the capacity to conspire, varies directly with the authority delegated.54
Moreover, the finding of a restraint of trade also varies directly with
decentralization-the greater the authority delegated, the more inevitable
communication between internal corporate components becomes, and
this communication can be utilized in antitrust litigations as evidence of
agreed upon understandings.55 In other words, the net effect of the intra-
corporate-conspiracy doctrine, according to the appellate court, is to
"hand to the plaintiffs, on a silver platter, an automatically self-serving
conspiracy. ' 'Se
The appellate court's discussion of intracorporate conspiracy seems
questionable on several grounds. First, the court's mechanical and ar-
bitrary application of the single-entity rule has rendered the unincor-
porated aspect of a division sacrosanct, regardless of how abusive the
50. Id. at 920. The court in Hawaiian Oke relied on the "rule of reason" enunciated in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1. (1911), to guide each court's discretion in
determining whether "in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the
wrong against which the statute [the Sherman Act) provided." Id. at 60. Applying the rule
in Hawaiian Oke, the court considered itself bound to protect the broad public policy favor-
ing competition and thereby to prescribe every act, whether its form was new or old, which
unduly interfered with the flow of interstate commerce. Id. at 917-18.
51. 416 F.2d at 82.
52. See note 25 supra.
53. 416 F.2d at 84.
54. The appellate court seemed to reason as follows: the larger the corporation, the
more authority necessarily delegated; the more authority delegated, the more autonomous
the corporate component; the more autonomous the corporate component, the more likely
conspiratorial competency will follow. See 416 F.2d at 83-84.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 84.
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restraint of trade is.51 The net effect is to allow multicorporate enter-
prises, such as Seagram, to resort to division instead of subsidiary ar-
rangements in order to avoid section-one sanctions. 8 This result is clearly
contrary to the purposes of the antitrust laws,59 the liberality generally
accorded interpretation of the Sherman Act,6" and the Supreme Court's
holding that business may not avoid antitrust liability by accidents of
form. 1 Nevertheless, the appellate court seemed persuaded that business
form should be determinative of antitrust enforcement, especially since
the switch from subsidiaries to divisions resulted in a loss of limited
liability and certain tax advantages. According to the appellate court,
this proved that "de-incorporation" was not a sham.62 It is submitted,
however, that this conclusion is ill-advised. Certainly the gain of com-
plete exoneration from costly treble damage actions, coupled with a carte
blanche to engage in anticompetitive practices, is sufficient impetus to
forego limited liability and certain tax advantages. Arguably, it is such
carte blanche, rather than the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine, that
may "wreck havoc on the American corporate enterprise system.1
63
Second, the appellate court assumed that an acceptance of the intra-
corporate-conspiracy doctrine would inevitably cause all intracorporate
agreements to be violative of the Sherman Act. 4 This assumption, how-
ever, is unfounded. Section one of the Sherman Act requires not only a
conspiracy but also an "unreasonable" restraint of trade." Normal com-
munication between internal corporate components cannot be the basis
for a section-one violation, unless the communication in fact results in
an unreasonable restraint of trade.66
57. Willis and Pitofsky conclude that under the present antitrust laws, branches, divi-
sions, and departments are free to agree among themselves as to prices, territories, classes
of customers, levels of production, and the other aspects of planning generally associated
with the industrial and marketing process. Willis & Pitosky, Antitrust Consequences of
Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 20 (1968).
59. The Supreme Court has held that the purposes of the antitrust laws are to prevent
undue restraints of interstate commerce, to maintain its appropriate freedom in the public
interest, and to afford protection from the subversive or coercive influences of monopolistic
endeavor. Appalachian Coals v. United States 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1932).
60. In Appalachian Coals v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that the Sherman
Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitu-
tional provisions. The Court found that the Act "does not go into detailed definitions which
might either work injury to legitimate enterprise or through particularization defeat its
purposes by providing loopholes for escape. Id. at 360 (emphasis added). According to the
Court, "its [the Sherman Act's] general phrases, interpreted to attain its fundamental ob-
jects, set up the essential standard of reasonableness. They call for vigilance in the detection
and frustration of all efforts unduly to restrain the free course of interstate commerce ....
Id. (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13, 22 (1964); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
62. 416 F.2d at 83.
63. See note 25 supra.
64. 416 F.2d at 84.
65. See Standard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
66. See Note, 6 DUQUESNE U.L. Rav. 223, 226 (1968). Even if a court does, as a matter
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In addition to "reasonableness," the courts have added other safe-
guards to the restraint of trade requirement. For instance, courts will
deny recovery if the alleged anticompetitive activity is a "private con-
troversy" in which "the public interest is not involved.16 7 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has never condemned an alleged anticompetitive practice
without a "thorough canvassing of the facts;" 8 however, to insure fair-
ness, it is submitted that the per se rules 9 should not be applicable to
the intracorporate-conspiracy area.
Finally, the appellate court merely criticized the control test used
by the district court in endowing the Seagram divisions with conspira-
torial competency and never examined the rationale upon which the test
was predicated. The district court did not advocate separate-entity status
for divisions that handled intracorporate matters which only affected
outsiders indirectly. Rather, it reserved independence for only those
divisions which operated identically as subsidiaries in terms of economic
function and competitive effect in their external corporate dealings.70
This rationale is supported by ample Supreme Court precedent.71 In
Kiefer-Stewart, the Seagram enterprise argued that its subsidiaries'
status as mere instrumentalities thwarted a finding of conspiracy.72 The
court, however, rejected that contention, holding that subsidiaries which
of law, determine that divisions are independent entities capable of conspiring, the court itself
does not determine if the divisions did conspire in violation of section one of the Sherman
Act. The decision is a question of fact left to the jury. The jury looks at the facts of each
case and determines whether the alleged restraint of trade was reasonable. Id.
67. See Fedderson Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 521-22 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Arthur
v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824, 828 (D. Md. 1938).
68. Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372,
387 (1954). See also Comment, Refusals To Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58
YALE L.J. 1121, 1138 (1949).
69. Agreements between nonaffiliated competitors with respect to prices, division of
territories, or allotment of production are per se violations of section I of the Sherman Act.
See Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss.
L.J. 5, 21 (1963).
70. 272 F. Supp. at 920.
71. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
In Perma Life, Inc., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968), the Supreme Court stated that Kiefer-Stewart
was premised on a recognition that the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by
insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplat-
ing business behavior in violation of them.
In Sunkist Growers v. Winder & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962), the
Supreme Court again resorted to the holding-out test. The Court held that three cooperative
organizations were one organization in terms of practical effect and the meaning of section
six of the Clayton Act and section one of the Capper-Volstead Act and that in their in-
terorganizational dealings, they were immune from the conspiracy provisions of the antitrust
laws. The Court's holding was based on the premise that the use of separate corporations
had no economic significance in itself and that outsiders did not consider and deal with the
three entities involved as independent organizations. Id. at 29. Willis and Pitofsky also suggest
that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine should be limited to those instances where
"subsidiaries" hold themselves out as competitors. Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences
of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 20, 35 (1968).
72. 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
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hold themselves out as competitors cannot resort to a single-entity de-
fense.78
In the Hawaiian Oke case, however, the appellate court never con-
sidered whether Kiefer-Stewart was equally applicable to divisions that
hold themselves out as competitors in their dealings with outsiders. 74
This aspect of the district court's rationale still remains viable.
Review of both the district and appellate court decisions leads to
the conclusion that the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine is not, and
should not be, defunct. The question remains, however, as to what test
would most fairly, within the purposes of the antitrust laws, apply the
doctrine to the corporate enterprise system.
At first glance, the district court's decision seems to offer a feasible
alternative to the mechanical application of the single-entity rule, since,
for the first time, a court has attempted to ascertain in light of business
realities whether a division is more than just an agent of its corporation,
and is in fact comparable to an independent economic unit. Upon closer
scrutiny, however, certain aspects of the court's rationale present both
logical and practical difficulties.75 Logically, it seems inconsistent to
characterize the single-entity rule as applicable in vertical intracorporate
conspiracies, and then to assume that its mechanical application was not
similarly required in the instant horizontal situation merely because the
concerted activity occurred at a different level of corporate structure. 0
This assumption presupposes that the horizontal form is somehow in-
herently distinct from the vertical situation so as to allow a court to
apply the control test only when the concerted action occurs between
divisions. For a court to endow a division with the competence to con-
spire with other divisions and then to ignore that determination when
the same entity engages in concerted activity with its corporation is a
result based on form alone and is thereby contrary to Supreme Court
precedent.77 Moreover, if two or more divisions are charged with con-
spiring in violation of section one, but under the control test only one
can be deemed autonomous, the uncontrolled divisions would be recog-
nized as one entity at law with their corporation since, under the single
entity rule, the corporation as principal is answerable for the acts of its
agents. Under these circumstances, a court would be required to recog-
nize that two distinct legal units, the corporation as principal for its
controlled divisions and the autonomous division, were incapable of con-
spiring merely because the form is vertical and therefore requires a
73, Id.
74. 419 F.2d at 71.
75. It is submitted that the part of the district court's opinion examining a division's
behavior in terms of economic function and competitive effect remains sound analysis and
will not be questioned here.
76. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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mechanical application of the single-entity rule. Realistically, then, a
court should not be fettered by the form of conspiracy charged, but
rather, to avoid inconsistency should directly apply the test utilized in
the vertical as well as the horizontal situations. To reason otherwise
would permit an autonomous division to operate identically as a sub-
sidiary, which clearly has the capacity to conspire under existing ratio-
nale78 and thereafter escape Sherman Act liability merely because it
conspired with its corporation instead of with another autonomous divi-
sion.70
In Hawaiian Oke, the court posited that a division may be directed
and controlled in all other functions except the one alleged to be anti-
competitive and still be characterized as a distinct and separate legal
entity.80 Each facet of a division's operation, however, does not operate
in a vacuum completely unaffected by the retained powers of its cor-
poration."s For instance, the distributive function of the Seagram divisions
is dependent upon a continuous supply of liquor8 2 and funds for adver-
tising which are both controlled by the House of Seagram.83 The House
of Seagram then can withhold liquor or funds or even discharge the per-
sonnel of a division whose marketing policies prove unprofitable. s4 In
light of these retained powers, it seems unrealistic to depict the divisions'
distribution policies as "separable" from the direction of the House of
Seagram. 5
The wisdom of isolating only one economic area in which to test for
autonomy becomes even more apparent when a division is actually in-
dependent from its corporation's direction and control in every respect
but the one in which the conspiracy charge arises. For example, the
Seagram divisions can share with the House of Seagram authority to
78. See cases cited notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
79. 416 F.2d at 84.
80. 272 F. Supp. at 919. A division can only be an autonomous entity under the
control test if it is endowed with separable, self-generated, and moving power to act in an
area of economic activity alleged to be anticompetitive. Conversely, a division may not be
an independent entity if the particular facet of its operation was, for all purposes, controlled
and directed from above. The Hawaiian Oke court, however, never considered whether a
division may also be independent if the one particular facet alleged to be anticompetitive
was controlled and directed from above for some rather than all purposes. It can be
contended that a corporation's direction and control for some purposes is the direct anti-
thesis of a division's separable, self-generated and moving power to act. Reasoning other-
wise would suggest that a division may be autonomous in a particular area of economic
activity while at the same time be controlled in that function for some purposes by the
corporation. These positions, however, are logically inconsistent since a division cannot be
autonomous and controlled for some purposes at the same time.
81. 416 F.2d at 83.
82. See 272 F. Supp. 915 (1967) (pretrial statement from plaintiff).
83. See Id. at 923.
84. The employment function of the Seagram divisions is controlled by the House of
Seagram. See Id. at 924.
85. The Hawaiian Oke court has required as one element of its control test that a
division be endowed with "separable" power distinct from that of its corporation.
Id. at 920. Thus, if this requirement is not met, the division cannot be characterized as a
legal entity.
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choose advertising agents, but have "separable, self-generated and
moving power to act"8 in all other areas of economic activity. If those
divisions, without the approval of their subsidiary, conspire to withhold
future promotional campaigns from their present advertising agent, no
court would be able to impose section-one sanctions under the control
rationale since the conspirators, not being autonomous in the area alleged
to be anticompetitive, could not be separate legal entities.8 7 A comparison
of results between the two above-mentioned examples suggests the un-
tenable conclusion that a division directed and controlled for all pur-
poses except the one alleged to be anticompetitive is more suitable for
legal-entity recognition than another division independent in all but one
respect. On the basis of this conclusion, it becomes evident that the
district court's control test was too narrowly defined.
Furthermore, the control test is impractical since it can be easily
circumvented. A corporation, intent on escaping potential section-one
liability, can avoid any characterization of its divisions as legal entities
by increasing the "control and direction from above" 8 in those economic
areas that may be susceptible to restraint of trade charges. For example,
a corporation whose marketing function is effectuated through divisions
can require that all distributing and pricing decisions initated at the
division level be henceforth approved by the corporation before imple-
mentation. Arguably, the division's power to act cannot be characterized
as "separable"" when the corporation retains the option to accept or
reject the distributing or pricing policies innovated by the division. More-
over, even if a division is deemed autonomous when free to initiate its
own distribution policies at the moment of the concerted activity, a
Seagram by-law stating that all agreements between divisions are null
and void from the moment of agreement unless approved by the cor-
poration's board of directors or executive committee on sales may also
preclude autonomy.
Rejection of the control test on logical and practical grounds neces-
sitates the formulation of a new rationale to apply the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine to section-one conspiracies. One alternative is the
"holding out" test first suggested in Kiefer-Stewart."0 Under this test,
to determine if a division is an independent legal entity, a court would
consider whether, as a matter of law, a division did in fact hold itself
out as a competitor on the open market.91 If outsiders dealt with a divi-
86. Id. at 920.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See note 85 supra.
90. 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
91. It is submitted that the basis of the holding-out test is not necessarily one of
seeking out deception. But see Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Sub-
sidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 20, 37 (1968). Rather, it is predicated on the assumption that
any business entity that possesses sufficient market power to exert a coercive influence on
free competition should at least be subject to the antitrust laws. Cf. Appalachian Coals v.
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sion as an independent organization, distinct from other components of
the enterprise with which it is alleged to have conspired, the division
would be considered a legal entity for section-one conspiracy purposes.
Acceptance of this test seems desirable for several reasons. First,
similar to the district court's control rationale, the holding-out test is
geared to prevent competitive business entities with substantial market
power from engaging in anticompetitive practices with impunity. Second,
the holding out test is not limited to conspiracies at the same market
level, but is also applicable to actionable conspiracies between a corpora-
tion and one or more of its divisions, providing each division functions
as a competitor. Third, a multicorporate enterprise may be hesitant to
circumvent the holding out test by divesting divisions of their competi-
tive function, since to do so would sacrifice sales stimulation generated
by that very competition.
Thus, applying the holding-out test in the instant case, a court
could clearly find that the Calvert, Four Roses, and Frankfort Distillers,
all of which having advertised and promoted their respective products
as competitors, are separate legal entities capable of conspiring in re-
straint of trade.
United States, 388 U.S. 344, 359 (1932); United States v. American Can Co., 330 F. 859
(D. Md. 1916).
